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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to estimate a reasonable size and an appropriate 
structure for the Army of Reunified Korea (the Korean Federal Army, KFA). In addition, 
this study discusses methods of integrating Korean People’s Army (KPA) personnel of 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (PDRK), now commonly referred to as 
“North Korea,” into the KFA. To do this, this study starts with a planning threat from the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), estimates the combat potential of that threat, and then 
estimates the KFA forces needed to provide a robust defense against that threat. In 
addition, this study analyzes the appropriate composition of the KFA, using Germany’s 
military integration as a reference case.  
The proposed KFA components are High-Intensity Combat Units (HICUs), 
Homeland Defense Units (HDUs), and an Expeditionary Unit. The HICUs consist of two 
mechanized corps and one armored corps each, with forces that include nine heavy 
divisions, three armored divisions, and three artillery brigades per HICU. The HDUs 
consist of 18 homeland defense infantry divisions and one capital defense command, 
which have two homeland defense infantry divisions for a total of 20 homeland defense 
infantry divisions. The Expeditionary Unit consists of one brigade. The proposed 
personnel strength of KFA is approximately 350,000, which is about two-thirds the size 
of the current Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). North Korean military personnel could 
be utilized in the KFA through transforming and downsizing KPA combat units. To 
minimize dissatisfaction of discharged KPA professional soldiers, Reunified Korea 
should provide them with alternative job prospects by using them for reconstruction of 
the North Korean region, hiring them into military-related jobs, or providing training for 
other forms of employment. 
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Korea is a peninsula located in East Asia and has five thousand years of history. 
Geographical characteristics of the peninsula made Korea a sort of bridge that absorbed 
advanced knowledge and culture from China and passed it down to Japan. Also, Korea 
became a center of trading between China and Japan. However, when Korea had not 
sufficient power to defend itself, it was invaded by the neighboring powerful countries. In 
1230, Korea was forced to accompany Mongolia to attack Japan. In 1590, Japan invaded 
Korea as a preliminary step to attacking China. The Manchu War of 1636 also made 
Korea maintain a feuding relationship with the Manchu Dynasty, just as Korea did with 
the Ming Dynasty. In 1900, Korea lost its independence to Japan and suffered from an 
exploitative colonial policy. After World War II, Korea was divided into the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by other 
countries.  
In the late 20th century, ROK overcame the difficulties of the Korean War and 
became the 13th most economically advanced country (CIA, 2009) and even dispatched 
troops as a member of United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Forces to help countries in 
emergencies. However, because of DPRK’s threat, ROK is not completely free from the 
possibility of war and has to maintain a large number of military forces relative to its 
population (1.4%). The ROK employs a conscription system, as well, which also results 
in large opportunities lost due to reduced labor force, and restrains ROK from growing to 
be a major economic power in Asia. Therefore, reunification is likely to result in Korea 
becoming a major country among the world powers. Moreover, reunification is necessary 
for advancing peace and stability in East Asia and cooperation among these countries. 
According to Chosun Ilbo:  
U.S. investment bank Goldman Sachs speculated…that a Unified Korea 
could overtake G7 countries like France, Germany and Japan in economic 
strength…Goldman Sachs projected that, given North Korea’s potential, a  
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unified Korea will in 30–40 years be on a par with or overtake G7 
countries except the U.S. in dollar GDP [gross domestic product]. (Choi, 
2009)  
Although there will be a large expenditure to reconstruct North Korea, their 
analysis predicts a synergistic effect due to plenty of natural resources and labor force in 
North Korea combining with the technology and capital in South Korea. Furthermore, if 
Unified Korea takes advantage of geography, like construction of a railroad to the Eurasia 
region, Korea could be one of the primary economies for the distribution of goods in 
Asia. By unifying, Korea can also reduce defense spending and invest in economic 
growth. Moreover, by reducing the conscription period, Korea can accelerate productivity 
by further increasing its labor force.  
Due to these potential benefits, ROK has made several efforts to begin the process 
of  reunification, with food assistance, exchange visits of separated families, and the first 
Inter-Korean summit meeting since the end of the Cold War. However, reunification 
without preparation will exacerbate economic and political problems, such as high 
unemployment and active opposition by the North’s military personnel. Germany, which 
was in a situation very similar to that faced by Korea, had a difficult time due to 
economic problems and social conflicts with previous East Germans after reunification. 
Hankyung, a daily ROK economic newspaper, says that, at first, West Germany expected 
reunification to cost US$50 billion and planned to raise these funds through increasing 
taxes. However, the estimated cost of reunification soared up to US$500 billion by the 
end of 1991, and Germany is still spending 100 billion euros per year, which is equal to 
4% of GDP, to support the eastern German region (Yang, 2010). This modernization and 
integration of the eastern German economy is scheduled to continue until the year 2019, 
with transfers of approximately US$80 billion per year to eastern Germany (Wikipedia). 
This unexpected increased cost of reunification caused higher taxes, worsened budget 
deficits, and created high interest and unemployment rates. 
However, unlike the German Democratic Republic (GDR), DPRK maintains its 
own large military establishment, which most believe is larger than ROK’s. The DPRK 
military also has substantial political power. In addition to economic issues, the East 
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German people felt they were treated unequally to West German people and East German 
military officers were discontented with pension reductions, demotions, and discharges 
(Moon, 2005). According to William Lewis, founding director of the McKinsey Global 
Institute, ROK’s reunification will entail higher costs than Germany’s. He said: 
GDP per capita is only 5 percent of that of the ROK1, yet its population is 
about half. The corresponding ratios for East Germany were 50 percent of 
West Germany’ GDP per capita and only 25 percent of the population. 
The difficulties of German reunification look like a piece of cake next to 
the difficulties of Korean unification.” (William, 2004, p. 131)  
Therefore, Hankyung said on 14 January 2010 that experts estimate the cost of Korean 
unification will be nine times that of Germany’s and Peter Beck, a researcher at the Asia 
and Pacific Center of Stanford University, said Korea will spend at least US$2000 billion 
in total in unification, which means Korea has to spend 12% of its current GDP on North 
Korea for ten years. (Yang, 2010) In addition, DPRK’s people are isolated from other 
societies, unlike the East German people in the 1980s. Although 15 years has been passed 
since German reunification, Germany still has reunification-caused problems because 
West Germany had to take responsibility for East Germany. Like the German case, some 
experts warn that ROK would be bankrupt if Korea goes through with reunification 
without taking sufficient time to efficiently complete the process. A flood of refugees 
from DPRK could also become a major problem socially and economically to both ROK 
and China (Wikipedia). 
Therefore, to minimize reunification-caused problems, ROK has to prepare the 
reunification across many areas of effort. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) also has 
to participate in the government’s reunification efforts. First, ROKA needs to know a 
reasonable size at which to maintain the federal army after reunification because 
maintaining a reasonable force structure deters threatening neighbor countries while  
 
 
                                                 
1 There is significant uncertainty associated with the size of the DPRK economy, with estimates 
ranging from $5B to $30B, where the latter estimate is made using Purchasing Power Parity methods.  A 
complete analysis of the size of the DPRK economy and defense activity, measured in dollars, awaits 
further analysis. 
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minimizing costs and also dissolving of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) of DPRK. In 
the meantime, ROKA needs to prepare for how to absorb the KPA and utilize it until the 
reunification process will be settled.  
B. PURPOSE OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to tentatively estimate a reasonable size of the 
potential future Korean Federal Army (KFA) and determine what this army should do to 
support reunification. Although the methods are dependent on the reunification scenario 
(peaceful reunification under an agreement between ROK and DPRK, absorbing 
reunification caused by DPRK collapse, or reunification through war), this study analyzes 
ROKA’s mission in supporting reunification by answering the questions below under the 
hypothesis that Korea will be reunified without war. 
• Primary Questions:  
1. What national security challenges are expected after reunification? 
2. How would ROKA best support Korean reunification objectives? 
• Secondary Questions:  
1. What factors should be considered in estimating the size of the 
KFA after reunification? 
2. What are the significant similarities and differences in the 
reunification of Korea compared to Germany from a military 
perspective? 
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study will estimate the reasonable size of KFA to deal with external threats 
and investigate how to absorb DPRK. More specifically, this study will analyze a 
specified external threat and build KFA to be prepared for this challenge. Then this study 
reviews the German military reunification case and applies it to ROKA to support the 
reunification process. 
Chapter II discusses why the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a potential 
threat to a unified Korea and analyzes PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) so that 
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Korea can build an army which can address this national threat. Then this study estimates 
the PLA and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) deployable to a Korean 
campaign should war break out between Korea and PRC. Chapter III applies the 
Technique for Assessing Comparative Forces Modernization (TASCFORM) score to 
quantify PRC’s combat capability. Then this study also quantifies the ROKA and Korean 
Air Force combat capability using TASC scores. Chapter IV studies the case of 
Germany’s military reunification and compares it to Korea’s case. Chapter V builds a 
reunified Korean army model which is suitable to support ROK’s goals and analyzes how 
to integrate DPRK military assets. Chapter VI discusses conclusions and 
recommendations based on the limitations of this study. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study combines quantitative and qualitative analysis. For quantitative 
analysis, this study uses military information from the International Institute For Strategic 
Studies, Global Security, Jane’s Information Group’s study, RAND’s study, an 
anonymous Web site (http://cafe.naver.com/biofund.cafe?iframe_url), Mako’s study, and 
other books. To quantify combat capability, this study uses the TASCFORM scoring 
method. For qualitative analysis, this study performs comparative case analyses using the 
German military integration as a reference. Then this study analyzes modeling the KFA, 
and how the process of moving to this combined army will be carried out. 
The methodologies used in this study consisted of the following steps: 
• Review The Military Balance 2009 and RAND’s study of PLA 
• Estimate deployable forces of PLA 
• Review the TASC methodology  
• Calculate  the TASC scores of PLA and ROK 
• Review the studies on German reunification 
• Compare German and Korean reunification 
• Review the army’s mission from Korea Defense Paper 2006 
• Discuss the possible ways to absorb KPA and support reconstruction of 
the North Korean region. 
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II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) THREAT AFTER REUNIFICATION 
A. POTENTIAL THREATS TO REUNIFIED KOREA 
So far, the ROK has focused on the DPRK as the main potential enemy, with 
other countries attracting little attention as potential threats. Therefore, analysis of 
military threats to a reunified Korea is still in its early stages. However, to size the KFA 
with enough capability, to structure the army efficiently, and to set an operational 
strategy for the army, it is worth of postulating a potential threat and assessing its 
implications. This study follows Kim’s methodology, which considers political, 
economic, socio-cultural, geographical, and military factors in quantifying the potential 
threat to Reunified Korea (Kim et al., 1993). Although it is impossible to precisely 
specify military threats and to predict how they will evolve, this study concludes that 
PRC will be the most threatening country to a reunified Korea based on political, 
economical, socio-cultural, geographical, and military factors.  
In the political dimension, PRC and Japan’s economies have grown rapidly in 
recent decades while U.S. influence over Asia has declined. China, which was Asia’s 
leading power before being defeated in the Opium War by Britain in 1842, might well try 
to increase its influence in East Asia. In the economic dimension, even though ROK has 
not had any armed conflict with other countries so far, we should not ignore possible 
conflicts as trade increases. Conflicts over access to resources, the pressure of opening 
markets, and strains in trading relations can be expected. In particular, PRC has been 
largest destination for ROK exports and the second largest source of ROK imports since 
2003. Although this relationship can improve the friendship between PRC and ROK, 
trade frictions such as smuggling, illegal emigration from PRC to a reunified Korea, 
infringement of patents, and industrial espionage can worsen the overall relationship.  
In the socio-cultural dimension, religious conflict, drugs, human rights issues and 
terror could result in conflict. PRC cannot be ignored because it still maintains 
communism and has had a close relationship with DPRK since the Korean War. 
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Moreover, to solve their inward problems, such as the independence movement in Tibet, 
environmental pollution, crimes, and drugs, PRC may start a conflict with a reunified 
Korea. 
In the geographical factor, because of close proximity and natural resources, PRC 
can be the foremost land-based threat capable of threatening Korea. Not only does Korea 
have problems involving unsettled Gando (East and West),2 (Figure 1) which is half part 
of Shenyang (also known as Jiandao or Yanbian), and a continental shelf in the Yellow 
Sea expected to harbor oil, natural gas, and other natural resources, but PRC also tries to 
justify ruling DPRK by using a distorted view of history in which it is falsely claimed 
that Korea belonged to China in the past.3 PRC’s approach to this claim could cause 
conflict where both nations’ ambitions collide over the remains of DPRK.  
                                                 
2 The territorial claims stem from the territories held by Goguryeo and Balhae, ancient states in 
Manchuria from which Koreans claim heritage. In 1712, the Joseon of Korea and Qing of China agreed to 
delineate the boundaries of the two countries at the Yalu (Amrok) and Tumen Rivers. However, the 
interpretation of the Tumen River boundary causes problems. The name of the river itself originates from 
the Jurchen word tumen, meaning “ten thousand.” The official boundary agreement in 1712 identified the 
Tumen River using the characters 土門 (pinyin:tǔmen) for the phonetic transcription. However, the modern 
Tumen River is written as 圖們 (pinyin:túmen) in modern Chinese and as 豆滿 (두만) “Duman” in both 
modern Korean and Japanese. Some Koreans hence claim that the “Tumen” referred to in the treaty is 
actually a tributary of the Songhua River. Under this interpretation, Gando (where the Koreans settled) 
would be part of Korean territory.  Joseon and Qing officials met in 1885 and 1887 to resolve the dispute, 
but with little result. From 1905 onwards, Korea came under the influence and control of Japan and was 
unable to effectively pursue these claims. 
       After the liberation of Korea in 1945, many Koreans believed that Gando should be given over to 
Korean rule, but the military control by the U.S. in the south and the Soviet Union in the north hindered any 
unified Korean claim to the territory. In 1962, North Korea signed a boundary treaty with PRC setting the 
Korean boundary at the Yalu and the Tumen, effectively foregoing territorial claims to Gando. In 2004, the 
South Korean government issued a statement to the effect that it believed that the Gando Convention was 
null and void. The resultant controversy and strong negative reaction from PRC led to a retraction of the 
statement, along with an explanation that its issuance was an  “administrative error.” 
       A small number of South Korean activists believe that under a reunified Korea, the treaties signed by 
North Korea can be deemed null, allowing the reunified Korea to actively seek redress for Gando. Also, 
some scholars claims that China's efforts to incorporate the history of Goguryeo and Balhae into Chinese 
history is effectively a pre-emptive move to quash any territorial disputes that might rise regarding Gando 
before a reunified Korea could claim such or the Korean ethnic minority in the Manchuria region could 
claim to become part of Korea (Wikipedia, Jiandao). 
3 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences started its Northeast Project in June 2001 and obtained 
government permission in February 2010. The main point of project is to document that the northeast 
region of Asia, especially Koguryo and Balhae, which were regarded one of kingdoms of Korea, was 
actually part of China and not Korea. The aim of this project is to support China historically when China 
tries to exercise dominion over the North Korea region after a DPRK collapse.  
 9
 
Figure 1.   Map of Gando (From Do, 2009)  
In the military dimension, PRC has increased its defense budget rapidly and the 
resulting military capabilities will threaten a reunified Korea (and other states which 
border PRC). 
B. ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA) 
1. PLA Strategy 
According to the ROK Defense White Paper, PRC military strategy is “to win 
local wars under conditions of advanced technology” and to “pursue information and 
mechanization,” (Defense White Paper, 2006, p. 12). Based on rapid Chinese economic 
growth, the PLA will try to restructure its force and modernize with high-technology 
weapons to strengthen total war-making capabilities.  
In particular, PLA is transforming its structure toward transregional mobility (and 
power projection), and away from the previous regional defense focus. Based on this 
strategy, PLA was reduced by 200,000 troops, to 1.6 million, and transitioned from 
divisions (Divs) to brigades (BDEs) as the primary maneuver units.  
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Although PRC announced a defense expenditure of US$35.1 billion at the 
National People’s Congress in 2006, the U.S. Defense Department reported that it would 
be between US$70 billion and US$105 billion if research and development, weapon 
procurement, and military business profits are included (Defense White Paper, 2006, 
p.13). 
2. General Structure 
According to a RAND study, PLA has seven Military Regions (MRs), which 
include a total of 28 Provincial Military Districts (MDs). PLA has 18 Group Armies 
(GAs), with each GA consisting of three infantry Divs; a tank Div or BDE; an artillery 
Div or BDE; an antiaircraft artillery (AAA) Div or BDE; a communications regiment; an 
engineer regiment; a reconnaissance battalion; possibly a pontoon bridge regiment and/or 
an anti-chemical regiment; other combat service support units, such as transportation and 
medical units; and; in a few cases, a helicopter unit (called a group) (Blasko, 2002). 
Depending on their location and mission, there is some variation in the GAs’ orders of 
battle and usually two or three GAs belong to each MR, with the deployment and mission 
described in Table 1. 
Table 1.   PLA Ground Forces Organization (From Mulvenon &Yang, 2002) 
MR Mission Deployment 
Beijing Protect Beijing from 
Russian Attack 
24/65 GA 
38 Mechanized GA 
Chengdu Guard the border from 
Burma and Vietnam 
13/14 GA 
Guangzhou Guard the Taiwan coastal 
frontier 
41/42 GA 
Jinan Strategic reserve 20/26/54 GA 
Lanzhou Fight a Russian attack 21/47 GA 
Nanjing Guard the Taiwan coastal 
frontier  
1/12/31 GA 
Shenyang Protect Manchuria from 
Russian attack 
16/40 
39 Mechanized GA 
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In addition, PLA has reserve forces estimated at 0.8 million in 30 Divs, 3 artillery 
Divs, 12 air defense Divs and 7 logistic support BDEs. Moreover, according to The 
Military Balance 2009, there are 10 million (estimated) militia forces. (International 
Institute For Strategic Studies, 2009) Also, Lee says that PLA has Rapid Reaction Units 
(RRUs) and Rapid Deployment Units (RDUs) ready to respond to unexpected threats or 
insurgencies. The RRUs are equipped with heavy weapons and can deploy by railroad. 
The RRUs’ missions are suppression of riots and antiterrorism; the RDUs’ missions 
involve rebellions and local wars. These specially organized forces also have the 
capability to attack opposing combat forces before they reach PRC’s border (Lee, 2005). 
See Table 2. 
Table 2.   Deployment of RRUs and RDUs (From (Ko, 1995) 
 Structure Response Time Transportation 
Air 




























38 GA 2–7 days Railroad  Tanks, tow tanks Beijing MR
39 GA 2–7 days Railroad   Shenyang MR 
 
                                                 
4 Part of the PLA Air Force. 
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C. COMPARISION BETWEEN PLA AND ROK FORCES 
As can be seen from Tables 3 and 4, the gap between the defense budgets of PRC 
and ROK has become much bigger and this trend is likely to continue with PRC’s current 
military strategy.  
Table 3.   Comparing Defense Budget of PRC and ROK (From (IISS, 2005) 
(All figures in 
US$) 
2007 GDP 2007 Defense 
Budget 
2008 GDP 2008 Defense 
Budget  
PRC 3.24 trillion 46.1 billion 4.2 trillion 61.1 billion 
ROK 970 billion 26.5 billion 710 billion 28.6 billion 
 
Table 4.   PRC-ROK Military Balance in Static Terms (From IISS, 2009) 
CATEGORY PRC ROK 
NATIONAL (2008) 
Population 1,330M 49M 
GDP $4,220B $710B 
Defense Budget $61.1B $28.6B 
ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 
Active 2,185K 687K 
Reserves 800K (a) 4,500K(b) 
LAND FORCES 
Available Active Forces 48 Divs (c) 22 Divs (d ) 
NAVAL FORCES 
Destroyers 28 10 
Frigates 59 9 
Corvettes 0 28 
Submarines 62 12 
Mine Warfare 69 (e) 10 (f) 
Amphibious 244 (g) 12 (h) 
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CATEGORY PRC ROK 
Fleet replen & support 204 24 
AIRCRAFT (NAVY) 
Bombers (H-6/H-5) 25 / 10 0 





Recce / AEW 7/1 0 
AIR FORCES  




Transports  560 43 
Tankers 14 0 
Recce  200 103 
THEATER MISSILES 
IRBM 130-150 0 
SRBM 335 0 
NOTES:  
(a) Plus a large number of paramilitary forces (~0.7 million). 
(b) Plus a large number of paramilitary forces (~3.5 million). 
(c) Plus 37 BDEs, 3 airborne Divs (Air Force) and 3 marine BDEs. 
(d) Plus 7 special forces BDEs, 1 air assault BDE, 3 counter infiltration 
BDEs, 2 independent BDEs, 2 marine Divs and 1 marine BDE 
(e) Includes one minelayer. 
(f) Includes one minelayer. 
(g) Includes one LSD  
(h) Includes one LSD 
 14
D. A PRC-BASED PLANNING THREAT TO REUNIFIED KOREA 
Although PLA has strength in quantity, most of its units are still equipped with 
light and old-fashioned weapons because PRC puts more emphasis on modernizing the  
Navy and Air-Force. However, PLA’s size could threaten a reunified Korea, which faces 
PRC along a 1,360-kilometer (km) border, including 790 km along the Amnok River and 
521 km along the Tumen River.5  
Actually, the border between PRC and North Korea is not ideal for a PLA 
invasion because of mountains and the Amnok and Tumen Rivers. However, this study 
assumes that PRC will push ahead with an invasion to accomplish PRC’s objectives. See 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Border Between PRC and DPRK (From Google Maps) 
                                                 
5 The Sino-Korea Friendship Bridge, which crosses the Amnok River and the Tumen Bridge 
connecting the PRC and DPRK. The Sino-Korea Friendship Bridge (946 meters) crosses the Amnok River 
and connects the cities of Dandong, China and Sinŭiju, North Korea (Wikipedia, Sino-Korea Friendship 
Bridge, 2010). The Tumen Bridge crosses the Tumen River and connects the cities of Tureen, China and 
Onsung, North Korea.  
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Because PRC has to consider the threats from other countries (Taiwan, Russia, 
Vietnam, India, and Burma), its available forces against Korea will likely be three GAs in 
Shenyang, which borders the Korean Peninsula; three GAs in Jinan (PLA strategic 
reserve); one GA in Beijing (RDU); and one Div in Chengdu (RRU). It could be seven 
GAs (including one mechanized GA), one airborne corps, and one Div. Based on Jane’s 
Information Group’s information (Table 5), these GAs include five armored Divs, five 
mechanized infantry Divs, one light mechanized infantry Div, four motorized infantry 
Divs, two armored BDEs, two mechanized infantry BDEs, eleven motorized infantry 
BDEs, one army aviation group, three army aviation regiments, seven artillery BDEs, and 
six mechanized air defense BDEs. 
According to the Directory of PRC Military Personalities, an army aviation group 
consists of helicopter units which are subordinated to its group army (Blasko, 2002, p. 
323). Therefore, this study treats army aviation groups the same as army aviation 
regiments. In addition, to make estimation easier, this study considers an infantry Div to 
have the same firepower as a motorized infantry BDE. Although the airborne corps could 
be deployed to the Korea Campaign as an RDU, this study did not count it when 
quantifying the planning threat because the airborne corps will more likely be utilized for 
irregular warfare.  
Table 5.   Order of Battle of Deployable PLA Ground Forces to the Korea Campaign 
(From Jane’s Information Group, 2009) 
MR Unit Subordinate Unit 
Beijing 38th Group Army* 6th Armored Div 
  112th Mechanized Infantry Div 
  113th Mechanized Infantry Div 
  114th Motorized Infantry Div 
  8th Army Aviation Group (Helicopter) 
  6th Artillery BDE 
  U/I Mechanized Air Defense BDE 
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MR Unit Subordinate Unit 
Shenyang 16th Group Army U/I Motorized Infantry BDE 
  4th Armored Div 
  46th Motorized Infantry Div 
  68th Motorized Infantry BDE 
  69th Motorized Infantry Div 
  Artillery BDE 
  AAA BDE 
 39th Mechanized Group Army* 3rd Armored Div 
  115th Mechanized Infantry Div 
  116th Mechanized Infantry Div 
  190th Mechanized Infantry BDE 
  9th Army Aviation Regiment 
  Artillery BDE 
  Air Defense BDE (SAM/AAA) 
 40th Group Army 118th Motorized Infantry BDE 
  119th  Motorized Infantry BDE 
  120th  Motorized Infantry BDE 
  8th  Armored BDE 
  11th Artillery BDE 
  AAA BDE 
Jinan 20th Group Army 11th Armored BDE 
  58th Mechanized Infantry BDE 
  60th Motorized Infantry BDE 
  Artillery BDE 
  AAA BDE 
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MR Unit Subordinate Unit 
 26th Group Army 8th Armored Div 
  U/I Motorized Infantry BDE 
  138th Motorized Infantry BDE 
  U/I Motorized Infantry BDE 
  U/I Motorized Infantry BDE 
  8th Artillery BDE 
  54th Air Defense BDE (SAM/AAA) 
  Army Aviation Regiment 
 54th Group Army 11th Armored Div 
  127th Light Mechanized Infantry Div1 
  Motorized Infantry BDE 
  162nd Motorized Infantry Div** 
  1st Army Aviation Regiment 
  Artillery BDE 
  Air Defense BDE (SAM/AAA) 
Chengdu 13th Group Army 149 Mechanized Infantry Div** 
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III. QUANTIFYING THE PLANNING THREAT  
AND ROK FORCES 
A. PLA GROUND FORCES 
According to The Military Balance 2009, total personnel strength available to 
PLA ground forces against a reunified Korea would be about 540,000–250,000 in 
Shenyang MR, 190,000 in Jinan MR, and 100,000 in the 38th Mechanized GA (including 
Military District, garrison units and combat support service assets such as training 
facilities) (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009). However, even though 
there is a great deal of information about PLA ground forces personnel and equipment, 
there is no comprehensive assessment of capability because of Chinese secrecy regarding 
types and number of equipment. Therefore, this study relied on the RAND source, whose 
authors gained information from a parade commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 
founding of the PRC that was held on 1 October 1999 (Blasko, 2002, pp. 337–344) and 
some unofficial information from Web sites estimating the structure, manpower, and 
equipment of each type of unit (http://cafe.naver.com/biofund/68). 
For armored Div structures, based on Table 5, this study regarded the structure of 
PLA ground forces’ 4th and 8th Armored Divs, which are not available to the public, as 
probably similar to the 6th Armored Div, about which this type of information is 
available. Basically, an armored BDE has one mechanized infantry battalion, which has 
40 armored personnel carriers (APCs) or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); four tank 
battalions, which have three tank companies with 10 main battle tanks (MBTs) per 
company; one artillery battalion with 18 self-propelled (SP) howitzers and one AAA 
battalion. 
An infantry Div has three infantry regiments, one armored regiment, and one 
artillery regiment. This study regarded motorized infantry regiments to be the same as 
infantry regiments except for being equipped with APCs, IFVs, and trucks for rapid 
deployment. Actually, BDEs’ composition and strengths are not easy to estimate because 
their structures tend to be different based upon their missions. The RAND study indicates 
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that an armored BDE usually consists of several battalions, with one-third to half the 
personnel strength of a Div, but “it has regiment as intermediate headquarter between 
BDE and battalion,” (Blasko, 2002, p. 321). In addition, one mechanized BDE in 
Shenyang and one armored BDE in Beijing exercised during the period 10–15 September 
2006, with reported personnel strengths of 3,000 per BDE. Therefore, this study assumed 
that each infantry BDE has, on average, three infantry battalions, one tank battalion, and 
one artillery battalion and that a mechanized infantry BDE might have three mechanized 
infantry battalions, with each battalion having 31 IFVs; one armored battalion; and one 
artillery battalion. Therefore, a mechanized infantry BDE may have approximately 93 
IFVs and 31 MBTs. 
Motorized BDEs have, on average, three motorized infantry battalions, one tank 
battalion, and one artillery battalion.  An armored BDE would have three tank battalions, 
one mechanized infantry battalion, and one artillery battalion, for a total of 93 MBTs, 40 
APCs, 18 SP howitzers, and 6 AAA pieces.  
In addition, RAND found that the 6th Artillery BDE, in Beijing MR, has about 
340 officers, 220 noncommissioned offers (NCOs), and 1700 enlisted men organized into 
five battalions, each with 18 guns or rocket launchers (Blasko, 2002). This thesis assumes 
that other artillery BDEs are similar to the 6th Artillery BDE.  
The 1st Army Aviation Regiment has 16 Mi-17s, 3 Mi-6s, and 1 Mi-8. The 8th 
Army Aviation Regiment has 12 WZ-9s, 12 Z-9s, 12 Mi-8s, and 12 Z-11s. The 9th Army 
Aviation Regiment has 10 WZ-9s, 10 Z-9s, and 8 Mi-171s. The unidentified army 
aviation regiment has 10 utility-type and 15 attack helicopters.  
In summation, total deployable PLA personnel strength and equipment would be 






Table 6.   Manpower Assigned to PLA Ground Forces Unit  
(From Mulvenon & Yang, 2002) 
 Div Regiment Battalion
Infantry 12,000-13,000 2,800 700 
Armor 10,000 1,200 175 
Artillery 5,000-6,000 1,100 275 
AAA 5,000 1,000 250 
 
B. PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF) 
Since one PLAAF mission is to support ground forces through close air support 
(CAS), it is important to estimate available air forces for a Korea Campaign. To be 
responsive to PLA needs, PLAAF operational units are usually under the command of 
MR even if they are reported to an Air Force headquarters. PLAAF operational units are 
organized into Divs, BDEs, regiments, groups, squadrons, battalions, companies, 
platoons, squads, and flights—depending on the unit’s mission. Each Div usually has two 
regiments and one air regiment, which consists of three squadrons and has up to 36 
fighters or bombers. Based on analysis of the PLA ground forces’ threat, this study 
estimated that operational units attached to the Beijing MR, Shenyang MR, plus all 
fighters and bombers in the Jinan MR, could participate in operations against Korea. 
However, because of Beijing MR’s own mission, and the threat of other neighboring 
countries such as Russia and Mongolia, and because of lack of maintenance and logistics, 
it is not easy to deploy all of the fighters in the Beijing, Shenyang, and Jinan MRs. 
Therefore, this study assumed that the Beijing MR would not deploy the 24th Air Div, 
whose mission is air defense. 
The Jinan MR might use all its aircraft but a lack of facilities and logistics at the 
Shenyang airbase would make it difficult for them to attack alongside Shenyang 
operational units. 
From Table 7, it appears that there are 23 deployable air regiments, including two 
reconnaissance air regiments, that have the J-7/J-8/Q-5 series, as well as J-11/Su-27/JH-
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7As. Assuming that each air regiment has 36 combat aircraft (with JH-7 regiments having 
20 aircraft), there are 288 J-7s, 108 J-8 series aircraft, 108 J-11s, 36 Su-27s, 144 Q-5 
series, and 20 JH-7As. 
Table 7.   Order of Battle of Deployable PLAAF to Korea Campaign (From Jane’s 
Information Group, 2009) 
MR Unit Base Type Role 
Shenyang 1st Air Div    
 1st Air Regiment Anshan J-11 Air Superiority 
 2nd Air Regiment Chifeng J-7E Air Defense/Attack 
 3rd Air Regiment Anshan J-8F Air Defense 
 11th Air Div    
 31st Air Regiment Siping Q-5D Attack 
 32nd Air Regiment Siping Q-5D Attack 
 21st Air Div    
 61st Air Regiment Mudanjiang-
Hailang 
J-8H Air Defense/Attack 
 62nd Air Regiment Qiqihar J-7 Air Defense/Attack 
 63rd Air Regiment Mudanjiang-
Hailang 
J-7 Air Defense/Attack 
 30th Air Div    
 Air Regiment Dandong J-8E Air Defense/Attack 
 Air Regiment Dalian J-7E Air Defense/Attack 






Beijing 7th Air Div    
 19th Air Regiment Zhangjiakou J-11 Air Superiority 
 15th Air Div    
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MR Unit Base Type Role 
 43rd Air Regiment Huairen 
(unconfirmed)
J-7C Night fighter 
 44th Air Regiment Lingqiu 
(unconfirmed)
Q-5 Attack 
Jinan 5th Air Div    
 13th Air Regiment Weifang Q-5 Attack 
 14th Air Regiment Weifang JH-7A Attack 
 12th Air Div    
 34th Air Regiment Jinan J-7G Air Defense/Attack 
 35th Air Regiment n/a J-7 Air Defense/Attack 
 36th Air Regiment n/a J-7 Air Defense/Attack 
 19th Air Div    
 55th Air Regiment Jining Su-27 Air Superiority 
 55th Air Regiment Jining J-11 Air Superiority 
 56th Air Regiment Zhengzhou J-7B Air Defense/Attack 
 1st Reconnaissance 
Air Regiment 





C. APPLYING THE TASCFORM METHOD FOR ASSESSING COMPARATIVE 
FORCES’ MODERNIZATION FOR PLA 
So far, we have quantified PLA ground forces and PLAAF combat capabilities 
based on what weapon types they have and how many. However, just knowing the 
number and type of PLA ground forces and PLAAF weapons is not sufficient; it might 
result in wasting resources in fielding a KFA to defend against a weak PRC threat. 
Although the Chinese military maintains a considerable number of weapons, these 
weapons vary from old-fashioned to high-tech. Therefore, it is essential to quantify the 
threat based on their combat characteristics, such as payload, firepower, maneuverability, 
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etc. To get the real combat capabilities, this study applied TASCFORM, which “provides 
static indicators of military force potential called measures of effectiveness (MOEs)” 
(Regan, 1995, p1–1). In TASCFORM, there are scores for Weapon Potential (WP), 
Weapon System Potential (WSP), Adjusted Weapon System Potential (WSP), Adjusted 
Weapon System Potential (AWSP), Designated Force Potential (DFP), and Equivalent 
Force Potential (EFP) (Table 8). In this analysis, we will use AWSP scores for 1999, 
called AWSP9, as the relevant TASC scores because it adjusts WSP for TASCFORM 
bridging factors in relating ground forces to tactical air (TACAIR) assets. 





WP Basic system measure of effectiveness reflecting: 
• Payload 
• Range, basing models, and standoff weapon range 
• Maneuverability 
• Speed/mobility 
WSP Adjusts WP for 
• Target acquisition and guidance/fire control 
• Susceptibility to countermeasures 
• Weapon enhancements 
• Navigation 
• Survivability 
• Minimum range capability 
• Mobility enhancement 
AWSP Adjusts WSP for 
• Obsolescence (which can be included to produce 
depreciated measures of effectiveness or excluded at the 
analyst’s discretion) 
• Productivity 






DFP Basic force level measure of effectiveness considers: 
• Distribution of assets 
• Inventory levels 
EFP Adjust for 
• Command, control, communications, and intelligence 
(C3I) system effects 
• Aircrew proficiency 
• Logistics and maintenance 
• Multi-role capability 
• Tactical impact of inventory changes 
 
Because TASCFORM analysis does not include all PLA ground forces and 
PLAAF weapons, there are some missing data. Therefore, this study uses closely related 
weapon types to score PRC weapons based on available data or the author’s guess. For 
example, there is no score for the J-11, so this study assigned the Su-27’s score to the J-
11 as well because the Su-27 is the most similar to the J-11 (Wikipedia). For 
unrecognized weapons, this study assigns the most common weapon’s or possible 
weapon’s score. So, for example, this study assigned the WZ-523’s score to unknown 
APCs (Jane’s). However, for unknown MBTs, this study assigned the Type-96’s score 
based on their mission and character of unit—even though PLA ground forces possess 
more T-59s. For unknown attack helicopters and utility helicopters, this study assigned 
Mi-17 and Z-9 scores, respectively. This study also decided to exclude the Z-11, which is  
manufactured in PRC, from scoring because it is used for command, control, 
reconnaissance, and training, which does not directly damage an enemy 
(GlobalSecurity.org).  
Unfortunately, there is no data corresponding to a rifleman’s TASC score, so this 
study extrapolated the rifleman’s score from Mako’s study (Mako, 1983, pp114-125). 
Even though there is a difference in combat power between PLA infantry and ROK 
 26
infantry, it varies according to individual characteristics. Because ROK infantry would 
generally be in defensive positions when war breaks out, ROK infantry will be in a 
superior tactical position than PLA infantry. Therefore, this study weighed ROK infantry 
by multiplying by 1.2 while PLA infantry score remains at the baseline value. In Mako’s 
study, he assigned a weight value of 55 to the M60A1 tank while the Weapon 
Effectiveness Index (WEI) is 1 and assigned small arms 1.2 for category weight and 1 
for WEI. Based on his study, this study assumed that an infantryman’s combat 
capability is one-fifty fifth that of an M60A1. The AWSP9 of the M60A1 is 3.230, 
and so this study arrived at the conclusion that the infantryman’s TASC score would 
be 0.059 (3.230/55). Therefore, the PLA ground forces and PLAAF’s TASC scores 
will be as shown in Tables 9 and 10.  
Table 9.   PLA Ground Forces TASC Score (AWSP 9) 
  
Type of 




Arms Rifle 0.059 107000 6313
MBT 
Type-98A/96 
(aka T-80) 5.507 100 551
Type-88B 4.673 200 935
Type-95I 4.7 100 470
Type-79 1.799 100 180
Type-59B 1.31 100 131
Type-59D 1.799 100 180
Type-70 2.411 100 241
Unknown 
(Type-96) 5.507 1920 10573
IFV / 
APC 
WZ-551 1.157 180 208
Type-86A 1.942 100 194
WZ-501 1.942 1300 2525
Type-63 0.744 200 149









MRLs 10.383 216 2243
Type-89I SP 
Guns 5.322 108 575
Type-83(H) 3.393 198 672
Type-89I(H) 1.744 540 942
122 MRLS 10.383 126 1308
AA Guns 
Type-37/56 0.382 162 62
Type-65 0.135 216 29
HQ SAM 0.666 108 72
Mortar 120mm(SP) 1.435 63 90
Helicopter 
WZ-9 / Z-9 
(aka AS 365N 
Dauphin) 
(Wikipedia) 1.732 54 94
Mi-6 0.787 3 2
Mi-8 2.018 23 46

















J-7 10.923 288 3146 
J-8: (E/F/H) 8.606 108 929 
Q-5 3.807 144 548 
J-11(aka Su-
27SK) 13.244 108 1430 
Su-27 13.244 36 477 
JH-7A 18.527 20 371 
Total Score 6,901 
So, the total TASC score for PLA is 35,787. 
D. TASC SCORES—ROKA AND ROKAF (REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR 
FORCE) 
This study also scored ROKA and ROKAF’s combat capability and compared it 
to the PLA threat (see Tables 11 and 12). Although ROK maintains huge reserve forces 
(4.5 million), they are poorly equipped with weapons and it takes several days to be ready 
for combat; mobilization and training is needed to call them up, make them regain 
combat sense, know their mission, etc. So, it is not easy to estimate precisely how they 
use their combat ability during war. In addition, reserve forces should be considered as a 
last resort, when the Korean military cannot resist an enemy’s attack with active forces, 
not as a part of units that are automatically deployed when war breaks out. Therefore, this 
study excludes reserve forces when generating a TASC score for ROKA, PLA and, later, 





Table 11.   ROKA TASC Score (AWSP9) 






Arms Rifle 0.0708 90,332 6,396
MBT 
T-80U 5.507 80 441
Type-88 4.673 1,000 4,673
M-47 1.53 400 612
M-48 1.57 850 1,335
AIFV 
BMP-3 2.245 40 90
K200A1 1.775 2,000 3,550
K200 1.184 1,700 2,013
M-113 0.867 420 364
M-577 1.05 140 147
BTR-80 0.95 20 19
KM-900/901 1.056 200 211
Artillery 
K-9 (aka  PzH 
2000 155mm SP) 
 8.067 1,076 8,680
K-55 (aka M-109 
A2) 7.098 1,040 7,382
M-110 8.346 13 108
M-101/KH-178 2.362 1,700 4,015
M-114/M-115/KH-
179 3.867 1,800 6,961
Kooryong 12.383 156 1,932
227mm MRLS 33.204 29 963
KM-29 1.157 6,000 6,942
AAA 
I-HAWK 1.104 158 174
Patriot 4.938 48 237
MIM-14 1.222 200 244
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20mm Vulcan 0.386 150 58
BIHO 0.29 20 6
20mm Vulcan 0.237 60 14
GDF-003 3.663 20 73
Helicopter 
AH-1F/AH-1J 3.182 60 191
AS-332L 1.732 3 5
BO-105 1.134 12 14
HUGHE 500D 0.916 130 119
MD-500 1.046 45 47
UH-1H 0.835 20 17
UH-60P 3.075 130 400
Total 58,433 
 
Table 12.   ROKAF TASC Score (AWSP9) 
 
 
The total score for ROK is 63,934, which is higher than that for PLA. Because 
this study has better data about ROK forces than PLA, this estimated difference might 
differ from the current situation.  Although ROK has a higher score than PLA, this does 
Type AWSP9 Score 
Number of 
Aircraft Score 
F-15K 24.219 59 1,429 
F-5B 4.571 20 91 
F-5E 7.892 142 1,121 
F-5F 7.858 32 251 
KF-16C 12.425 118 1,466 
KF-16D 9.53 47 448 
F-4E 9.922 70 695 
Total Score 5,501 
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not guarantee that ROK would be superior to PLA during an engagement. Because the 
relevant border for mounting an attack is 1,311 km, which is the combined length of the 
Amnok and Tumen Rivers, ROK has to deploy units to several places to cover all border 
crossings while PLA can focus all of its assets to one place to infiltrate a defensive line. 
Therefore, ROK has to have a strategic reserve with a TASC score similar to PLA’s 
deployable units in addition to all guard units which could be deployed across the border. 
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IV. CASE STUDY OF GERMANY’S MILITARY INTEGRATION 
A. REUNIFICATION OF KOREA SCENARIO 
As previously stated in this study, the appropriate military integration process will 
vary with the national reunification scenario. According to the RAND study, “Preparing 
for Korean Unification: Scenarios and Implication” (Pollack, 1999), reunification 
scenarios can be categorized as follows:  
• Integration and peaceful reunification 
o ROK and DPRK begin to increase economic, social, and political 
interaction and accomplish national reunification without any 
engagement.  
• Collapse and absorption 
o A worsening economic and political situation drives Kim Jung-il 
(or his successor) to lose power over the DPRK. A military coup or 
people’s demonstration ensues, with the U.S. and ROK restoring 
stability in the North Korea region. 
• Reunification through conflict 
o To maintain communism and dictatorship by Kim Jung-il (or his 
successor), DPRK invades ROK. However, ROK-U.S. combined 
forces repel DPRK’s attack, conquer North Korea, and receive 
DPRK’s surrender.  
• Disequilibrium and potential external intervention 
o Kim Jung-il’s regime is overthrown but the successor government 
cannot afford to resolve economic problems and political 
instability. As a result, the DPRK government asks for the 
international community’s support.  
Among these four scenarios, the disequilibrium and potential external intervention 
scenario do not seem to directly lead to reunification. In addition, reunification through 
war might lead to focusing on reconstruction of damaged areas, and rounding up the 
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remaining enemy troops, rather than absorbing KPA, which precludes consideration of 
one of the major research questions of this study. Therefore, this study assumes 
reunification will occur through peaceful agreement or DPRK’s collapse, so ROK is in 
control of the reunification process, and under which circumstances some strong 
opposition groups could cause serious damage unless dealt with effectively.  
B. GERMANY’S MILITARY PERSONNEL INTEGRATION  
To avoid mistakes during the reunification process, it is a good idea to analyze 
previous similar cases and apply lessons learned to Korea—with perhaps some 
modifications. The most relevant and useful case is the reunification of East and West 
Germany. Germany had been split since its unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945 until 
3 October 1990. In 1985, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev began his 
perestroika policy and tried to build new relationships with Western countries. Moreover, 
some of the Eastern countries suffered severe economic problems and communism no 
longer seemed to be a solution to these problems. These developments motivated East 
Germans to demonstrate for democracy and to immigrate in larger numbers to Western 
countries. 
To maintain control, the East German government asked the military to repress 
demonstrations and demanded Soviet military intervention. However, with breakdowns 
of military and civil authority, the government failed to repress its people and agreed to 
establish a government through election.  
Because the reunification process was led by West Germany, the Bundeswehr 
(West German military) made plans to absorb East Germany’s military. At that time, the 
Bundeswehr maintained 5.5 times more military personnel, 2–3 times more weapons, and 
spent 2.6 times more money on its military than East Germany (Moon, 2005). Because 
the National People’s Army (National Volksarmee or NVA) of East Germany supported 
the political system as their main mission, 96% of its officers and 60% of its 
noncommissioned officers were communists (Moon, 2005). Furthermore, the military 
consisted of 37.3% officers and the ratio became 72.7% when including 
noncommissioned officers, which was a much higher ratio than applied to the 
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Bundeswehr (Moon, 2005). West Germany organized the Bundeswehr Eastern Command 
and began to reorganize the NVA into one Corps with 50,000 troops. Based on its own 
criteria (Table 13), the Bundeswehr examined 60,000 candidates who wanted to stay in 
the military and selected 10,800 of them to serve in the German confederation military 
after receiving additional training (Moon, 2005). While discharging every general officer, 
political officer, psychological warfare officer, and military judicial officer, special 
technicians in various categories were permitted to join the unified German military 
(Moon, 2005). Some high-ranking officers were downgraded after consideration of their 
ages (Moon, 2005). To reduce its military force to 0.37 million, which was its appropriate 
number, the conscription period was shortened from 15 months to 12 months (Moon, 
2005). By increasing the combined percentage of officers and noncommissioned officers 
from 45.4% to 58%, the military had flexibility in increasing its forces in emergency. As 
a result, Germany could unify its military and provide an adequate defense with 370,000 
military personnel (Table 14) (Moon, 2005). 
Table 13.   Criteria of Selection (From Moon, 2005) 
 Criteria Number of Personnel Management 
A Useful position after 
unification 
773 positions (27,200) Accept as member of 
German military 
B Unnecessary position 516 positions (27,600) Pick some up after 
screening 
C Political/Psychological 









Table 14.   Military Forces of West Bundeswehr and NVA before Unification  
(From Moon, 2005) 
 
Before Unification After Unification 
(1995) West East 
Personnel 
Army 345,000 120,000 255,000 
Navy 39,000 16,000 33,000 
Air-Force 111,000 37,100 82,000 
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C. COMPARISION OF GERMAN AND KOREAN SITUATIONS BEFORE 
REUNIFICATION 
The reunification of Germany is a good reference case for planning for a unified 
Korean military. However, it is necessary to understand the situational differences 
between Korea and Germany before applying the German model to a Korean military 
integration.  
First, the Bundeswehr was larger than NVA. In contrast, the DPRK military 
maintains almost twice as many personnel and has 1.2 to 1.7 times as many weapons as 
ROK. KPA itself maintains 1.7 times more personnel than ROKA (Table 15). If ROK 
fails to demilitarize and reorganize the DPRK military effectively, internal conflicts will 
likely ensue, resulting in high unemployment rates for former military personnel, which 
would be a source of instability even without armed conflict breaking out. 
Table 15.   Military Forces of ROK and DPRK (From IISS, 2009) 
 Before Unification 
 South North 
Personnel 
Army 560,000 950,000 
Navy 68,000 46,000 
Air-Force 64,000 110,000 
Total 687,000 1,106,000 
Units 
Army 
17 Infantry Divs 
5 Mechanized Infantry Divs 
27 Infantry Divs 
4 Mechanized Corps 
Navy 
3 Fleets 
2 Marine Divs 
1 Marine BDEs 
4 Fleets 
Air-Force 12 Wings 4 Divs 
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 Before Unification 






























Second, military officers are accustomed to taking political and economical 
advantage of DPRK’s “Military First” policy. Integration seems to be a threat to their 
current positions just as most NVA officers were discharged upon absorption into West 
Germany. DPRK officers would likely not give up their current privileges willingly and 
might trigger a coup against reunification. In addition, because the DPRK military 
maintains a close relationship with PLA, its members could try to deter reunification 
through PRC intervention. PRC once supported the DPRK by sending numerous Chinese 
People’s Volunteers (CPVs) and still maintains PRC-DPRK relations—including 
military-to-military ties (Son, 2003). Furthermore, the DPRK military’s opposition to 
reunification might provide the PRC with a reason to intervene in a Korean reunification. 
Also, according to Within Beijing (Kim, 2002, p. 130), PRC would experience the 
following negative impacts from a Korean reunification: 
• A reunified Korea would remove the DPRK as PRC’s critical buffer zone.  
• Korean reunification would diminish Beijing’s leverage in Korean and 
world affairs, including its relations with the U.S.  
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• Korean reunification could spew more refugees from DPRK into PRC’s 
northeastern provinces.  
• A reunified Korea could bring about possible territorial conflicts regarding 
the PRC-Korea border.  
Therefore, DPRK personnel who disagree with reunification will be a major threat 
to ROK during the reunification process unless there is some guarantee regarding their 
social and economical situation post-reunification.  
D. APPLYING GERMANY’S MILITARY INTEGRATION CASE TO THE 
KOREAN MILITARY INTEGRATION PROCESS 
To minimize potential problems, such as a coup d’etat by those who fear 
reunification, ROKA should formulate what a post-reunification Korean military would 
look like, what its mission would be, what its size should be, and how DPRK forces 
(especially the army) would be absorbed into the unified Korean military (especially 
KFA).   
At first, ROKA should demobilize the DPRK army while preventing or 
controlling armed resistance (perhaps in the form of an insurgency). So, ROKA should 
attempt to gain the support of senior DPRK officers by persuading them not to spread 
canards within DPRK—such as rumors of job losses and social instability after being 
absorbed into KFA. Therefore, ROKA needs make clear the criteria for accepting DPRK 
soldiers into KFA, and how to keep the remaining DPRK soldiers from experiencing 
economic difficulties.  
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V. MODELING THE KOREA FEDERAL ARMY (KFA) 
A. COMPONENTS AND SIZE OF KFA 
To estimate a reasonable size for KFA, this study used TASC scores as a basis 
and also considered what KFA roles will be needed after reunification. According to 
ROK Defense White Paper 2006, the objectives of the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) are, “defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding 
peaceful unification and contributing to regional stability and world peace.” Based on 
MND’s objectives, this study found that KFA’s roles would be “(a) guarding the country 
from external military threats and invasion mainly from PRC, (b) participating in 
stabilization and reconstruction of DPRK Region, (c) defense against internal threats 
from terrorists and insurgents and (d) participating in Peace Keeping activity” (Defense 
White Paper, 2006, pp. 30–31). 
To fulfill these roles, KFA should have enough high-intensity combat units 
(HICUs) to equal the PLA threat’s TASC scores, with some territorial defense units 
(TDUs) to cover the Korea-PRC border, guard the coasts, and deal with terrorism or 
insurgency. In addition, Korea should have a least one BDE for peacekeeping abroad. 
1. High-Intensity Combat Units (HICUs) 
To defend against external military threat which is mainly PRC, a reunified Korea 
should maintain military forces sufficient to deter a PLA invasion by providing a robust 
conventional defense of Korean territory. Those combat forces should be structured to 
operate effectively at the PRC-Korea border. Because most of the border is covered by 
the Amnok and Tumen Rivers, and a reunified Korea’s military will likely have advanced 
surveillance equipment, such as the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), it 
would seem to be impossible for PLA to prepare for an attack and to cross the border 
without a reunified Korea’s detection and recognition. Therefore, this study assumes 
KFA will be ready to defend PLA’s attack before PLA crosses the border, so KFA will 
not need to deploy units across the border to watch PLA’s movements—as ROKA and 
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KPA are currently deploying heavy forces across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). While 
KFA has a defender’s advantage at the land border, it also has a burden to provide forces 
to deal with the possibility of amphibious attacks. In addition, commanders’ leadership, 
strategic knowledge, and unit morale are important factors in determining combat 
capability. However, intangible factors such as these are too complicated to precisely 
assess (absent detailed situational knowledge), so this study approaches sizing the KFA 
combat force by building forces with similar TASC scores as the PLA threat. Because the 
reunified Korean army will aim at high-technology equipment, high-intensity firepower, 
and highly mobile forces, every KFA Div will be similar to U.S. mechanized infantry or 
armored Divs. Therefore, this study focuses on building structures similar to U.S. 
mechanized infantry or armored Divs from 1978 and adjusting them to be suitable for the 
expected operational environment (Tables 16 and 17).  
Table 16.   U.S. Mechanized Infantry Div (December 1978)  
(From Mako, 1983, p. 114) 
Category Weapons Number of Weapons 
I Small Arms 3,456 
II APCs 582 
III Tanks 216 
IV Armored Recon Vehicles 27 
V Antitank Weapons 402 
VI Artillery 66 










Table 17.   U.S. Armored Div (December 1978) (From Mako, 1983, p. 115) 
Category Weapons Number of Weapons 
I Small Arms 2,880 
II APCs 555 
III Tanks 324 
IV Armored Recon Vehicles 27 
V Antitank Weapons 344 
VI Artillery 66 
VII Mortars 98 
 
Based on U.S. Div structure, this study added attack helicopters for mountain 
operations and air defense units for rapid response to enemy air attack. So, a KFA 
mechanized infantry (armored Div) will be approximately 15,000 personnel (12,000 
personnel in armored Div) and consist of:  
• An armored BDE that consists of two tank battalions and one mechanized 
infantry battalion (two armored BDEs for an armored Div) 
• Two mechanized infantry BDEs that consist of one tank battalion and two 
mechanized infantry battalions per BDE (one mechanized infantry Div for 
an armored Div) 
• One artillery BDE that consists of four SP artillery BDEs 
• One reinforced anti-air defense company 
• One army aviation company 
• Other combat support and combat service support units. 
In addition, to support corps and attached Divs, KFA will have artillery BDEs that 
consist of four 155 mm SP artillery BDEs and one 130 mm Multi-Launch Rocket System 




In generating the TASC score of a KFA mechanized infantry/armored Div, this 
study excludes antitank weapons and mortars to be consistent with the TASC result 
generated for PLA. Those types of weapons were not considered for PLA due to data 
constraints.  
From Tables 18, 19, and 20, the TASC score of a KFA mechanized infantry Div 
is 3,059, a KFA armored Div is 3,564, and a artillery BDE is 804, which means that a 
reunified Korea needs at least six mechanized infantry Divs, three armored Divs, and 
three artillery BDEs to bring its total score to 31458, which is larger than PLA’s score 
of 28,8866. To carry out their missions effectively, these mechanized infantry Divs and 
armored Divs will be reorganized as two mechanized infantry corps (I and II) and one 
armored corps (III). The I Mechanized Infantry Corps will consist of two mechanized 
infantry Divs, one armored Div and one artillery BDE. It will be located in the northern 
part of Korea to react rapidly to an invasion. The II Mechanized Infantry Corps will 
consist of three mechanized infantry Divs and one artillery BDE. It will be located in 
central part of Korea to fortify a second front line and cover any retreat of the I 
Mechanized Infantry Corps. The III Armored Corps will consist of two armored Divs, 
one mechanized Div and one artillery BDE. It will be located in the southern part of 
Korea as a strategic reserve7 and to counterattack. Although this study only addresses 
conventional weapons, there will be special forces BDEs for unconventional warfare 
and a missile command to control Korea's various missile units such as Army Tactical 
Missile System (ATACMS), Patriot, and Hyunmoo ballistic missile. Because Small 
arms are likely to predominate in special operation forces, the TASC total would be 
negligible.8 Also, to achieve essential equivalence of regional PLA and KFA HICU, 
                                                 
6 Although the total TASC score of PLA is 35,787, this study just focuses on PLA ground forces 
because this study excludes Korea Federal Air Force and the TASC scores of aircraft should not be added 
to those of ground weapons without additional analysis.   
7 Although the term strategic reserve is used in this thesis, the specifics of the actual combat 
environment might result in different uses of the three "strategic reserve" HIDU divisions. They might be 
employed against amphibious operations and other contingencies. 
8 For this reason, this thesis also doesn’t consider HDUs, Expeditionary Units in balancing combat 
capability with PLA.  
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only available TASC scores were used. Therefore, these unconventional units are not 
considered in this thesis.   
 
Table 18.   TASC Score of KFA Mechanized Infantry Div 
Category Type of Weapon 
Number of 
Weapons TASC Score Total Score 
I Small Arms 3,456 0.0708 245 
II APC(K-200A1) 582 1.775 1,033 
III Tanks (K-1) 216 5.507 1,190 
IV Artillery (K-55) 72 7.708 555 
V Air Defense/Arty(BIHO) 24 0.29 7 
VI Armed Helicopter(AF-1F) 9 3.182 29 
Total 
Score    3,059 
 
Table 19.   TASC Score of KFA Armored Div 
Category Type of Weapon 
Number of 
Weapons TASC Score Total Score 
I Small Arms 2,880 0.0708 204 
II APC(K-200A1) 555 1.775 985 
III Tanks(K-1) 324 5.507 1,784 
IV Artillery (K-55) 72 7.708 555 
V Air Defense/Arty(BIHO) 24 0.29 7 
VI Armed Helicopter(AF-1F) 9 3.182 29 
Total 





Table 20.   TASC Score of KFA Artillery BDE 
Category Type of Weapon 
Number of 
Weapons TASC Score Total Score 
I Artillery (K-9) 72 8.067 581 
II MLRS(KOORYONG) 18* 12.383 223 
Total 
Score    804 
* Although current ROKA has 12 MLRS per battalion, KFA will have 18 MLRS per battalion to maximize 
its effect, like the U.S. Army.   
2. Homeland Defense Units (HDUs) 
To react rapidly to insurgencies, terrorism, defense of rear lines, and in support of 
HICUs, KFA needs to have HDUs. The missions of HDUs are: 
• Protect citizens, infrastructure, government offices, and historic sites from 
enemy 
• Support HICUs’ requirements, such as guarding logistics route, military 
facilities, and military transportation, as well as participating in 
stabilization operations  
• Provide paramilitary support to local police forces and counterinsurgency 
operations 
• Provide humanitarian assistance in the event of natural disasters or other 
emergencies 
• Support provincial government requirements, such as  participating in 
infrastructure construction. 
Currently, ROKA maintains 13 homeland defense infantry Divs. A homeland 
defense infantry Div’s main missions are guarding infrastructure and supporting 
conventional forces. This allows the conventional forces to fulfill their combat power by 
defending their rear areas from DPRK’s Special Forces, which is very close to the 
mission of the TDUs. The homeland defense infantry Div consists of about 3,000 actives 
and 7,000 reserves. Based on the current ROK maintenance of one or two homeland 
defense infantry Divs per every province, a reunified Korea should have one homeland 
 47
defense infantry Div for each province, except the capital, Seoul. These homeland 
defense infantry Divs might be reinforced with equipment and active duty personnel. In 
the capital region, because of its importance and complexity, KFA should have a capital 
defense command that consists of two homeland defense infantry Divs. In addition, 
P’yongyang will need one homeland defense infantry Div because of its importance as a 
cultural and historical significance. In a reunified Korea, there will be 18 provinces in 
addition to the special districts of Seoul and P’yongyang, so KFA will establish the 
Homeland Defense Command, which consists of 18 homeland defense infantry Divs and 
the capital defense command for a total of 20 homeland defense infantry divisions. 
Each homeland defense infantry Div will consist of about 3,500 actives and 
10,000 reserves. The reserves are citizens who get basic training every year. The reserves 
main roles are guarding infrastructure, blocking possible terrorist attacks or escape 
routes, and assisting police in evacuating citizens. To cover the entire provincial area 
while maintaining small size, mobility is critical factor for the TDUs. Therefore, TDUs 
should be located near cities or central area of a province and equipped with helicopters, 
IFVs/APCs, and trucks.  
The main structure of a homeland defense infantry Div will include: 
• One rapid reaction BDE, which consists of four anti-terror battalions  
• One medical battalion 
• One engineering battalion 
• One reserve training center 
• Four mobilized reserve regiments 
• Other combat support units 
3. Expeditionary Units 
To respond to international society’s demand, ROK decided in 2008 to build a 
crisis management force that is able to rapidly deploy all over the world to support 
emergencies (Yoon, 2009). This unit is supposed to play the roles of peacekeeping 
observation, reconstruction, medical support, and guarding the Korean people. Because 
of the high possibility of facing unexpected attack and terrorism, this unit would be based 
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on special forces, which are well-trained and have advanced combat skills. However, for 
operationally flexibility during dispatching, this unit should be attached directly to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. For construction and medical support, this unit is planned to have an 
engineering battalion and a medical battalion. Therefore, this unit would consist of:  
• Four special mission battalions with approximately 1,000 total personnel.  
• Combat support/service support forces with approximately 1,000 total 
personnel, including medical, engineering, and transportation units  
• Strategic reserve forces with approximately 1,000 total personnel for use 
in shifting personnel to needed areas 
The total number of expeditionary forces, therefore, will be approximately 3,200 
(including manpower of command staffs). A reunified Korea also needs to have this type 
of unit to contribute to world peace. This unit will be belong to the Special Operation 
Command and will receive administrative support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
numbers of this type of unit could be increased based on a reunified Korea’s economic 
conditions, status in the world, and the situation in troubled parts of the world. For 
maximizing its survivability, this unit will be equipped with high-technology equipment 
and weapons. Moreover, considering the long period of training required, this unit must 
have a slow cycle of human resources turnover by organizing it with professional 
soldiers.  
To sum up, the overall structure of the KFA is represented in Table 21. However, 
the number of HICU can be varied depending on the PLA’s regional military posture. In 
addition, this study didn’t mention about combat support, combat service support, 
training facilities and special operation forces. Therefore, the total size of KFA will be 
approximately 350,000, including personnel above the Corps level.9 
 
 
                                                 
9 This thesis assumes that one Security BDE assigned to each HICU Corps. However, this thesis 
doesn’t consider the TASC scores of Security BDE due to its TASC score is very small.  
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Table 21.   Order of Battle of KFA  
Type of Unit Order of Battle Subordinate Manpower 
HICU I Mech. Inf. Corps 2 Mech. Inf. Divs 
1 Armored Div. 
1 Artillery BDE 
1 Signal BDE 
1 Special Assault 
Regiment 
55,000 
II Mech. Inf. Corps 3 Mech. Inf. Divs 
1 Artillery BDE 
1 Signal BDE 
1 Special Assault 
Regiment 
55,000 
III Armored Corps 1 Mech. Inf. Div 
2 Armored Divs 
1 Artillery BDE 
1 Signal BDE 
1 Special Assault 
Regiment 
50,000 
Missile Command ATACMS BDE 
Hyunmoo BDE 




Command 10  
6 Special operations 
BDEs 
1 Airborne BDE 
1 Special mission 
BDE 
17,000 
HDU Homeland Defense 18 Homeland Defense 65,000 
                                                 
10 Under current ROKA reforms, Special Warfare Command consists of seven special operation BDEs 
and one special mission unit to six special operation BDEs, one special mission BDE and one airborne 
BDE. ROKA expects special forces to become modernized and multi-functional to deal with a new security 
environment after reunification (Weekly Chosun, 2000). Therefore, this study assumes that the structure 
and size of special forces after reunification will be similar to ROKA’s special forces after reform. 
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Type of Unit Order of Battle Subordinate Manpower 
Command Infantry Divs 
Capital Defense 
Command 





Expeditionary BDE  3,200 
B. INTEGRATING KPA INTO KFA 
As mentioned above, one of the most important things in the unification process 
would be addressing DPRK forces after reunification. KPA maintains 950,000 personnel 
and reckless downsizing will cause strong resistance from KPA members and a high 
unemployment rate. Therefore, ROKA needs to plan how to downsize itself and integrate 
KPA into KFA. 
1. Downsizing of ROKA 
If the ROK military and the DPRK military become unified, there will be 1.6 
million forces on the Korean peninsula, which causes inefficiency and creates a sense of 
threat in neighboring countries. So, for maintaining military efficiency and avoiding 
heightened tensions with other countries, Korea needs to cut down its military forces 
carefully. Especially if unified Korean forces would be smaller than the current ROK 
force, the ROK military needs to prepare to reduce military posture. So, like the German 
military, ROKA would increase the ratio of officers and noncommissioned officers while 
decreasing the total number of military personnel. Although the army can expect an 
increase in the cost of maintaining people by increasing the number of officers and 
noncommissioned officers, the army can easily increase the military. Thus, by replacing 
the long periods of entry training needed for some soldier’s positions, such as tank 
drivers, self-propelled gun drivers, radar operators, and mechanics to noncommissioned 
officers, the army expects to increase combat capability in terms of quality. In addition, 
by cutting down the conscription period from two years to one year, the army can reduce 
the force size naturally.  
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2. Downsizing of KPA 
In addressing KPA’s downsizing case, a careful approach is required to minimize 
troubles. Although the Bundeswehr could integrate the NVA though establishing the 
Eastern Command, NVA officers were not satisfied with worse treatment than 
Bundeswehr officers after becoming members of a unified German military. A 
considerable number of former Easten German officers said that they would have 
accepted exile to other communist countries or protested the integration had they known 
of the unification process as directed by the Bundeswehr (Moon, 2005). The Bundeswehr 
accepted some NVA because they were needed for the unified military (after adjusting 
their ranks), selected some after examinations, and discharged people who were in the 
political, psychological, or no-longer needed positions. As a result, many former NVA 
personnel felt humiliated and developed psychological stresses by being discharged or 
demoted (Moon, 2005). Therefore, the ROK military should consider the DPRK military 
members’ requests and do their best to satisfy their new positions while supporting 
KFA’s strategic goal.  
Based on DPRK’s proportion of the population in a reunified Korea, the 
proportion of KPA in KFA will be one-third of total manpower, or approximately 
120,000 personnel. So, KPA has to downsize from 950,000 to 120,000, which means 87 
percent of them must retire, move to another job, or be discharged. For professional 
soldiers, the army can induce voluntary retirements by offering pensions and job training. 
It would be necessary to discharge people who are in political, judicial, or psychological 
positions just as the German military did. For enlistees, by reducing the conscription 
period from five-to-twelve years to one year and discharging enlistees who have already 
served more than one year, the army can expect a considerable decrease. For the 
remainder, the army will offer education programs to help KPA soldiers adjust to the new 
social and military system and discharge those who have trouble in adapting to the new 
army system due to differences in the social system and indoctrinated ideology or are 
otherwise not eligible to serve in KFA. 
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However, the discharge process should be flexible because KPA non-political 
military intellectuals or elite senior analysts can be helpful to KFA even if they might 
have more difficulty in adjusting. KFA can also utilize KPA senior officers as counselors, 
instructors, or professors in military-related schools. For harmony between ROKA and 
KPA, KFA can also assign some personnel of high competence and non-political officers 
as commanders of specialized task forces. In addition, it will be helpful for KFA to  
induce people to stay in the military who are in specialized positions, such as missilery, 
special warfare, and Soviet/PRC liaisons, for which they are better suited than ROKA 
personnel.  
KFA should eliminate possible dissatisfaction factors for discharged personnel by 
offering job training programs to help them obtain  new jobs without problems and to 
guarantee their economical stability. One way would be using them as a reconstruction 
workforce to rebuild North Korea region with modern infrastructure development. 
Establishing a government-owned company for reconstruction and hiring former KPA 
members at salaries commensurate with their military ranks would be helpful. To provide 
the budget resources for this endeavor, KFA can raise money by selling military 
equipment and weapons to other countries and selling land owned by the DPRK military.  
3. Transforming KPA 
According to Bermudez’ study, KPA is composed of Artillery Command, 
Mechanized Command, AAA Command, the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, 
and 20 corps (twelve infantry, four mechanized infantry, one tank, two artilleries, and the 
P’yongyang Defense Command) with approximately 950,000 personnel (Bermudez, 
2001, p. 57).  
The mission of the artillery, mechanized, and AAA commands is exercising 
administrative control over all artillery, all tank and mechanized infantry, and all anti-
aircraft/air defense-related units as well as providing logistics support. Among infantry 
corps, the I, II, IV, and V Infantry Corps are categorized as forward corps, which are 
deployed along the DMZ and are well-equipped and trained. The other corps are 
considered rear corps, which are smaller and more poorly equipped than forward corps. 
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So approximately 70 percent of active duty units are deployed in forward corps and more 
than half of the infantry units of the rear corps consist of mobilized Paramilitary Training 
Unit Divs (Bermudez, 2001, pp. 57–58).  
Table 22.   Order of Battle of Current KPA (From Bermudez, 2001, pp. 57) 
Order of 
Battle 




4 Infantry/Motorized Infantry Divs 
4 Paramilitary Training Unit Divs 
1 Tank Regiment 
1 Artillery Regiment 
1 MRL Regiment 
1 Light Infantry Regiment 
1 Technical Engineer Battalion 
1 Communication Battalion 
1 Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion 
1 Transportation Battalion 
1 Maintenance Battalion 
70,000 P’yongyang 
I Inf. Corps 5–6 Infantry /Motorized Infantry Divs 
1 Tank BDE 
2–3 Light Infantry 
 BDEs 
1 Sniper BDE 





V Inf. Corps Kangwon-Do 





Subordinate Manpower Location 
IV Inf. Corps 1 Artillery BDE 
1 AAA Regiment 
1 Artillery Instrument Reconnaissance 
Battalion 
1 ATGM Battalion  
1 Anti-Tank Gun Battalion 
1 Reconnaissance Battalion 
1 Engineer/River-Crossing BDE 
1 Technical Engineer Battalion 
1 Road Construction Engineer 
Battalion 
1 Electronic Warfare/SIGINT 
Battalion 
1 Communication Regiment 
1 Wire Maintenance Battalion 
1 Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion 
1 Transportation Battalion 
1 Maintenance Battalion 
2 Hospitals 
2 Heavy Mortar Regiments 
Hwanghaenam-
Do 
III Inf. Corps 2–5 Infantry Divs 
1 Tank BDE 
1 MRL BDE 
1 Artillery BDE 
1 AAA Regiment 
1 Artillery Instrument Reconnaissance 
Battalion 
1 ATGM Battalion  
1 Anti-Tank Gun Battalion 
1 Reconnaissance Battalion 

















Subordinate Manpower Location 
U/I Inf. 
Corps 
1 Road Construction Engineer 
Battalion 
1 Communication Regiment 
1 Wire Maintenance Battalion 
1 Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion 
1 Transportation Battalion 




IX Inf. Corps Hamgyongbuk-
Do 
XI Inf. Corps 
** Chagang-Do 




4–6 Mechanized Infantry Divs 
1 Tank BDE*** 
1 Light Infantry BDE*** 
1 MRL BDE 
1 Artillery BDE 
1 AAA Regiment 
1 ATGM Battalion 
1 Reconnaissance Battalion 
1 Technical Engineer Battalion 
1 Electronic Warfare/SIGINT 
Battalion 
1 Communication Regiment 
1 Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion 
1 Transportation Battalion 


















Subordinate Manpower Location 
820th Tank 
Corps 
1–2 Mechanized Infantry Divs 
5 Tank BDEs 
1 MRL BDE 
1 Artillery BDE 
1 AAA Regiment 
1 Reconnaissance Battalion 
1 Engineer/River-Crossing Regiment 
1 Technical Engineer Battalion 
1 Communication Regiment 
1 Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion 
1 Transportation Battalion 
1 Maintenance Battalion 








5–9 MRL BDEs 
5–9 Artillery BDEs 
1 AAA Regiment 
1 Artillery Instrument Reconnaissance 
Battalion 
1 Communication Regiment 
1 Engineer Battalion 
1 Nuclear-Chemical Defense Battalion 
1 Transportation Battalion 







*  VII Corps has 1 light infantry BDE 
** X and XI Corps do not have tank BDEs 
*** Some of the Mech. Corps do not have tank BDEs or light infantry BDEs 
According to Table 22, each province has one infantry corps, except Kangwon-
Do, P’yongannam-Do, and Hamgyongnam-Do, which have two infantry corps.  Although 
these corps’ mission is invading ROK, these corps are familiar with the territorial 
characteristics of their province and remain close with the native people. Therefore, one  
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useful approach to integrating KPA is to transform these infantry corps and the 
P’yongyang Defense Command into TDUs. For example, the I Infantry Corps will be 
converted to the Gangwon-do TDD after downsizing11.  
However, Kangwon-Do, P’yongannam-Do and Hamgyongnam-Do have two 
infantry corps each, which means one of the corps in each province cannot be converted 
into TDUs. Because KFA aims at mechanized forces based on high mobility and 
firepower, these units are not suitable to HICU either. So, the V, VII and U/I Corps will 
be demobilized and selected personnel in these corps will be moved to other KFA units..  
Unlike ROK. mechanized units, the mechanized corps in KPA are better equipped 
with trucks and APCs, which provide rapid “protected” movement compared to regular 
infantry corps (Joseph, 2001, p. 61). By reducing their size and replacing trucks with 
IFVs, these mechanized corps will become mechanized Divs, which corresponds with 
KFA’s strategic goal of employing HICUs. The 820th Tank Corps, which is the only tank 
corps in KPA and is equipped with high proportion of modern T-62 tanks (compared to 
T-54/55 and T-59 which are in the infantry corps and the two artillery corps) also will be 
used as a HICU after downsizing its personnel and equipment.  
KPA is well known for its formidable special operations forces of 25 BDEs and 
28 battalions (Bermudez, 2001, pp. 78). During peacetime, light infantry BDEs are 
attached to army corps and carry specific missions. During wartime, these infantry BDEs 
revert to the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau and to execute special operations 
(Bermudez, 2001, pp. 78). Most of the personnel who serve in these forces are selected 
from among those who have served four to seven years in combat units and are politically 
reliable, have zeal for the Communist Party, and get good evaluations from their senior 
officers. These special operations units are recognized as elite units within KPA 
(Bermudez, 1998, pp. 215–216). Because of their current privileged positions, 
indoctrination to communism, and their pride in being members of the best units in 
                                                 
11 Due to possibility of armed protest by former DPRK soldiers, KPA units in the North Korean region 
could be mixed with former ROK soldiers. However, although this approach might be helpful to control 
former DPRK soldiers, the salary difference right after reunification may makes former DPRK officers feel 
that they are treated unequally. Because of this limitation, this study does not address the mix of ROKA 
and KFA soldiers within KFA units. 
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DPRK, they would not easily give up their positions and social status compared to other 
personnel by being integrated into KFA. Therefore, ROKA needs to consider unit and 
individual characteristics when deciding which of the special operations forces personnel 
should be integrated into KFA to avoid conflicts within the unified Army.  
The light infantry BDEs and battalions that are under the army corps can be 
transformed to anti-terror units under TDUs and the rest can be used as Special Weapons 
and Tactics (SWAT) teams under the police. The amphibious sniper BDE can be 
converted to duty like the U.S. Navy SEALs or Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs), 
which has the closest mission profile. Sniper BDEs under the Reconnaissance Bureau and 
the other special operations forces, airborne BDEs, airborne sniper BDEs, and light 
infantry BDEs under the Light Infantry Training Guide Bureau can be integrated with 
ROK special operations forces and utilized as KFA special operations forces or 
dispatching units. By inducing voluntary retirements and cutting back recruiting, it is 
anticipated that downsizing KPA special operations forces can be done without strong 
resistance.  
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Table 23.   KPA Order of Battle of Special Operation Forces (From Bermudez, 1998) 
Organization Type Brigades Battalions Manpower Total 
Army Corps Light Infantry Battalions  23 500 11,500 




Airborne BDEs 3  3,500 10,500 
Airborne Sniper 
BDEs 3  3,500 10,500 








Battalions  5 500 2,500 
Sniper BDEs 3  3,500 10,500 
Total  25 28  101,500 
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Reunification can be an opportunity for Korea to become a major power. 
However, without preparation, reunification also might cause enormous economic loss 
and social chaos. For example, Germany’s total unification cost soared to US$50B in late 
1991; some experts estimate the cost of Korean reunification will be at least US$2,000B 
in total due to DPRK’s inferior situation compared to East Germany. To minimize 
problems caused by reunification, ROKA has to prepare to efficiently and selectively 
integrate KPA personnel into a KFA which has enough combat capability to deal with 
external threats—primarily the PLA. PRC, which spent US$61B on its “official” defense 
budget in 2008, has 2.2 million personnel and 48 Divs. Considering PRC’s other 
neighbors—such as Russia, India, and Taiwan—the estimated PLA ground forces 
deployable to the Korean Peninsula is assessed as three Group Armies (GAs) in the 
Shenyang Military Region (MR), three GAs in the Jinan MR, one GA at Beijing, and one 
Div at Chengdu. In addition, PLAAF would likely deploy 23 air regiments and two 
reconnaissance air regiments in support of a land invasion of the Korean Peninsula. 
Based on the TASCFORM scoring system’s AWSP9 combat potential metric, 
PLA forces applicable to a Korean scenario score 22,500 and PLAAF score 6,900, which 
totals 29,400. (The ROKA AWSP99 TASC score is 58,400 and ROKAF is 5,500, which 
totals 64,000.)  Accordingly, this study estimates that three KFA heavy corps provide 
sufficient combat capability to ensure a robust defense against a PLA invasion. Most of 
the rest of the KFA troops provide for homeland security (or territorial defense) 
missions—to include construction, counterinsurgency, and civil order capabilities—in 
homeland security units. Finally, the KFA will likely also need a force for deployment 
outside the peninsula (primarily in support of multilateral peacekeeping missions). 
Before considering methods of integrating KPA personnel into the KFA, this 
study analyzes Germany’s military unification, based on the assumption that Korean 
reunification will be occur through peaceful agreement or DPRK collapse. In Germany, 
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the military unification process was led by the Bundeswehr, with its Eastern Command of 
10,800 selected after examinations among the 60,000-strong East German Army (NVA) 
candidates who wanted to stay in the military. Then Germany reduced its military force 
to 370,000, achieved by shortening conscription terms and increasing the ratio of 
professional soldiers. Although Germany’s military unification is a good reference point, 
ROKA needs to consider that KPA is bigger than ROKA (unlike Germany’s case), and 
that significant elements of KPA would not support reunification. 
Therefore, ROKA should be careful in integrating KPA personnel and should 
communicate a reasonable plan for KFA to address the concerns of KPA professional 
soldiers. To support the objectives of the MND, KFA will consist of HICUs, HDUs, and 
Expeditionary Units. The HICUs consists of six mechanized infantry Divs, three armored 
Divs, and three artillery BDEs, which have a larger combat potential than the PLA 
planning threat (measured in TASC scores). The HDUs consist of 20 Homeland Defense 
Infantry Divs, including the Capital Defense Command. The Expeditionary Unit consists 
of one expeditionary brigade. Thus, the total personnel strength of KFA will be about 
350,000.  
Population ratios indicate that about two-thirds of KFA will come from ROKA, 
and one-third from KPA. Therefore, ROKA needs to prepare for downsizing by 
increasing the proportion of professional soldiers and reducing conscription periods. KPA 
has to reduce its size down to one-tenth but the demobilization of the KPA should be 
carefully addressed because of potentially adverse effects on KPA’s professional soldiers. 
So KFA has to provide a variety of measures to address economic and social stability.  
Some KPA combat units will be reorganized as HDUs in the northern part of 
Korea after downsizing.  The 820th Tank Corps could be used as part of the HICU, and 
special forces could be used as KFA special forces or as paramilitary units in support of 
the police. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This study shows that the HICUs have about half the combat potential of the 
current ROKA (Figure 3). Due to KFA’s emphasis on heavy forces, the expected number 
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of HICU divisions is less than half the number of ROKA Divs. The remainder of KFA is 
for other missions—homeland security and expeditionary forces—so in this particular 
analysis, it is estimated that KFA will have, in total, about two-thirds the combat 
capabilities of the current ROKA.  
 
Figure 3.   Comparision of TASC Scores Between ROKA and KFA HICUs 
It appears that KFA has more support structure than does ROKA (Table 24).  
Global Security reports that ROKA is moving toward heavier forces—with fewer 
divisions and more support structure per combat unit.12 Therefore, the tooth-to-tail 






                                                 
12 This result comes from calculation that divide total manpower by the number of  BDEs, Regiments 
and groups. 
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Table 24.   Comparison of the Division Makeup between ROKA and KFA 








ROKA 21 13 76 560,000 
KFA 9 20 37** 350,000 
* Includes Special Forces and Expeditionary Brigade 
** This total includes other brigades besides artillery organized as corps assets (such as signals and security 
brigades)13. 
The second part of this study discussed how to integrate KPA personnel during 
the reunification process. Because the expected size of KFA is approximately one-quarter 
of the current ROKA and KPA total, significant downsizing is indicated (Figure 4). 
Successful downsizing of KPA is likely to be one of the primary elements of successful 
reunification. 
 
Figure 4.   Comparision of ROKA and KPA Strength Before and After Reunification 
                                                 
13 BDEs, regiments, groups are contained in HICUs and Homeland Infantry Divisions with the 
exception of one expeditionary brigade. 
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C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
To prevent PRC intervention in the case of DPRK collapse, the ROK-U.S. 
alliance will likely become more important. Therefore, ROK needs to reach a common 
understanding with the U.S. about economic and military support for reunification when 
the time comes.  
Also, to partially offset the cost of reunification and avoid unnecessarily 
threatening neighboring countries, Unified Korea should be careful not to overspend for 
defense. Therefore, KFA needs to be properly sized. Its size should be large enough to 
deter potential threats, while avoiding too large a defense burden for Korea and becoming 
a destabilizing threat to its neighbors.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
This study has some limitations. Data available was insufficient to support a 
detailed analysis of PLA and PLAAF; our assessment of the PRC threat is only a 
reasonable first-order estimate. Within the TASCFORM methodology employed, the 
“bridging factors” used to relate air and ground force TASC scores are imprecise at best.  
Bridging factors are embodied in AWSP, but it is recommended that these factors be re-
examined. In addition, this study does not address combat support and combat service 
support factors in detail. Thus, the actual size of KFA will likely vary somewhat from our 
estimates. Moreover, this study does not address in detail the politics of integrating 
ROKA and KPA personnel into one Korean Army. It identifies some promising 
integration strategies (based partly on the German experience) but does not provide a 
detailed plan. 
E. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
In analyzing KFA, further studies could utilize Air Force TASC scores more 
precisely to improve estimates of total capability for air-land battles. Additionally, 
calculating naval combat potential would be useful in identifying the magnitude of the 
amphibious threat to Korea from PRC or other countries in the region. Also, analyzing 
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capabilities of combat support and combat service support of PLA could be helpful to 
achieving more precise net assessments of KFA versus the PLA threat. Finally, in the 
near future, network-centric warfare (NCW) will become an essential factor of war, so 
studies about the implications of NCW to KFA are needed. 
For integrating KPA personnel into KFA, more detailed analyses of political 
integration and physical reconstruction of the DPRK region are also needed. 
Additionally, cost-benefit analysis of accepting KPA professional soldiers and using 
KPA equipment would also be useful. A broad understanding of the possible paths to 
reunification could give ROKA greater flexibility and adaptability in preparing for and 
managing reunification. 
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